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Abstract 
By financially supplementing low wages, in-work benefits are an instru-
ment of active labor market policy to encourage labor market integration 
of low skilled and long-term unemployed persons. The hypothesis of this 
paper is that the financial benefit from the state, even though increasing 
the overall wage, is interpreted by the employee as a signal that employ-
ers are not willing to behave according to the norm of reciprocity and low-
ers wage satisfaction. This leads to negative side effects on employment 
stability foiling positive effects on labor market integration. This hypothe-
sis is tested using a survey of in-work benefit recipients and of nonrecipi-
ents as a comparison group. The method of propensity score matching is 
applied to eliminate all compositional differences between benefit recipi-
ents and nonrecipients except for the source of their income. It is shown 
that in-work benefits reduce wage satisfaction (as an indicator of per-
ceived violations of reciprocity) by 14 percentage points. However, 
whether this explains why in-work benefits are not successful in promot-
ing employment stability remains an open question. 
JEL-Classification: J48, C1, C41, D63 
Key Words: in-work benefit, wage satisfaction, reciprocity, propensity 
score matching 
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1 Introduction 
In the recent years in-work benefits (Scharpf, 1994; Whitehouse, 1996) 
have become an important instrument of labor market as well as social 
policy in many Western Countries. In-work benefits are a supplementation 
of low wages with a financial benefit provided by the welfare system. One 
of the earliest implementations is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
introduced in 1975 in the US. The original goal was to avoid poverty in 
low-income families with children, especially single mothers. 1994 the 
EITC was extended to low income earners without children. Following the 
example of its success, several European Countries introduced their own 
variants, e.g. Great Britain introduced the WFTC (Working Family Tax 
Credit) and France the "Prime Pour l`Emploi". Other in-work benefits have 
been implemented in Belgium and the Netherlands (Brücker and Konle-
Seidl, 2006, Blundell, 2000).  
Despite its pervasiveness in most Western welfare states, the aims pur-
sued with in-work benefits vary with the national context. Whereas Anglo-
Saxon in-work benefits are aimed at attenuating the poverty effects of a 
large low wage sector and low levels of unemployment benefits, in conti-
nental Europe in-work benefits are intended as an instrument for promot-
ing the extension of a low wage sector given a rather high level of social 
security (Eichhorst, 2006). Especially in Germany they are not so much 
aimed at the working poor but at financially motivating the unemployed to 
take up jobs with wages below the level of unemployment benefits (Vier-
ling, 2002; Spermann, 2002; Walwei, 2002). Several pilot-projects were 
started in the early 2000s to evaluate the effects of different implementa-
tions of temporary in-work benefits (Kaltenborn 2003). The results of 
these projects vary. Whereas evaluation of the "Hamburger Model" (a 
combination of in-work benefit with a wage subsidy to the employing firm) 
showed positive results on integrating the unemployed into stable em-
ployment (Jirjahn et al., 2006) the "Mainzer Modell" (MZM) has shown a 
neutral or even negative effect on employment stability (Kaltenborn et al., 
2005).  
However, most empirical evidence on Germany’s in-work benefits sug-
gests that they neither successfully motivate the unemployed to take up 
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low paid jobs nor do they have an effect on permanent labor market inte-
gration. On the contrary, they are plagued by rather high dropout rates 
during the supplementation periodi. For example dropout rates in the 
"Hamburger Modell"  were noted to be 56% of all benefit recipients 
(Gerhardt and Meyer Larsen, 2005: 12, see also Jirjahn et al., 2006: 27; 
Gerhardt and Prang, 2003: 22), the dropout rate in the "Mainzer Modell" 
during the first year was between 40 and 50% (Kaltenborn et al., 2005: 
38) and in the "Baden-Württemberger Einstiegsgeld"  dropout rates 
reached 47% (Dann et al., 2002: 49). At least for the "Mainzer Modell", 
where such data is available, it can be said that dropout does not seem to 
be motivated by the change to a better paid job. On the contrary about 
80% of former benefit recipients change into a status different than em-
ployment, with 66% returning to the former unemployment status. 
For an explanation this paper tries to identify one possible hindrance in 
motivating the unemployed to take up and most of all to stay in jobs by 
financially supplementing them with an in-work benefit. It is the assump-
tion that people behave as rational utility (i.e. money) maximizers. Fol-
lowing the reasoning laid out by neoclassical economic agency theory, the 
unemployed are assumed to maximize their financial utility and to face 
only objective (rather than subjective) restrictions (Opp, 2004). More spe-
cifically, the expectation that in-work benefits will motivate the unem-
ployed to take up employment in the low wage sector is based on the res-
ervation wage assumption.  The reservation wage is the minimum wage 
level that the unemployed are prepared to accept for work (Cahuc and 
Zylberberg, 2004: 8f) and is seen to be determined by the level of the un-
employment benefit, especially for unskilled labor. Therefore an unem-
ployed person will accept a job offer only if the wage paid by the firm 
reaches or surpasses the reservation wage / level of unemployment bene-
fit. By supplementing low wages with an in-work benefit, active labor mar-
ket policy aims at lifting wage offers from below the reservation wage over 
or at least up to the reservation wage threshold. This is expected to moti-
vate labor market participation because financial utility from the overall 
income is higher than from the unemployment benefit. After having ac-
cepted the job, this argumentation means that receiving an in-work bene-
fit should lead to a higher employment stability compared to regular em-
ployment without additional income, because opportunity costs are higher. 
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Giving up the subsidized job would result in a (higher) loss of income than 
giving up a regular job. This implies that more income is valued more 
highly irrespective of its source. But for in-work benefits the additional in-
come does not derive from the employment relationship, but is a benefit 
granted by the state. This paper proposes that subsidized income is val-
ued less even if it is higher than non-subsidized income, because social 
exchange relations in firms are more complex than neoclassical economics 
suggests. This is done on the basis of findings in sociology as well as ex-
perimental economics on the impact of the norm of reciprocity, more spe-
cifically the reciprocity of payment and job performance in employment 
relations. 
 
2 Reciprocity in employment relations 
The term reciprocity originates from early 20th century anthropological 
and ethnological analysis (Mauss, 1990; Firth, 1959; Malinowski, 2001; 
Sahlins, 1965) where it describes the basic principle or norm of gift ex-
change in non-market economies. Lately the principle of reciprocity has 
received much attention from scholars of sociology, economics and social-
psychology alike, describing the relation between what is given by ego 
and what is expected to be returned by alter not only in non-market but 
also in market exchange. However, what is meant by the term reciprocity 
differs not only between but also within disciplines. As Sobel (2005) ar-
gues, reciprocity can be seen as intrinsic or instrumental. If it is instru-
mental, then it follows the basic principles of utility maximization. For ex-
ample ego might be motivated by instrumental reciprocity if he/she re-
turns a gift, kindness etc. because he/she wants to "sustain a profitable 
long-term relationship or to obtain a (profitable) reputation for being a 
reliable associate".  On the other hand, reciprocity is intrinsic, when ego is 
"sacrificing his own material consumption to increase the material con-
sumption of others" (Sobel,  2005: 392). As Gintis (2000), who makes a 
similar distinction between weak and strong reciprocity, points out: "How-
ever laboratory experiments,  conducted in many different social settings 
by different research groups, consistently show that people tend to be-
have prosocially and punish antisocial behavior, at a cost to themselves, 
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even when the probability of future interactions is extremely low, or zero" 
(Gintis, 2000: 177). This quote also touches upon another aspect of recip-
rocity. Not only does the term refer to the repaying of kindness with kind-
ness, but also to the reacting with unkindness towards unkindness. In the 
former case reciprocity is said to be constructive, in the latter it is destruc-
tive (Sobel, 2005: 397; Fehr and Gächter 2000). Following the work of 
classical anthropological exchange theorists, Molm, Collett and Schaefer 
(2007) use yet another distinction, the one between direct and indirect 
reciprocal exchange. In direct reciprocal exchange the benefits are given 
from ego to alter and alter to ego in return, whereas in indirect reciprocity 
ego gives benefits to alter but receives benefits from a third person. 
A different, very encompassing typology is given by Sahlins (1999), who 
views reciprocity as a continuum ranging from generalized reciprocity to 
negative reciprocity with balanced reciprocity in between the two. An ex-
change relation is characterized by generalized reciprocity if there is only 
an implicit expectation about to which degree, when or even if alter will 
reciprocate ego's gift. In this regard the social side of the transaction 
dominates the material side. A transaction is characterized by negative 
reciprocity if it is mainly based on the material aspect. At the extreme a 
negative reciprocal transaction is the attempt to get something for free. 
Balanced reciprocity occupies the space in between generalized and nega-
tive reciprocity for several reasons. Firstly, balanced reciprocity focuses on 
the social as well as the material aspects of transactions. Secondly, it is 
characterized by the expectation that alter’s return to ego's gift is of cer-
tain value, given within a certain time. Since we neither expect the em-
ployee to work for free nor the employer to pay the wage without de-
manding something from the employee in return, exchange in employ-
ment relations in this paper will focus on balanced reciprocity (Akerlof and 
Yellen, 1990; Voswinkel, 2005; Kotthoff, 2000; Rousseau, 1989). Fur-
thermore we are only concerned with direct exchange relations and follow-
ing the vast experimental evidence it regards reciprocity as (at least in 
part) intrinsic rather than purely instrumental.  
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2.1 Violations of the norm of reciprocity  
Even though reciprocity has become an increasingly interesting field of 
study for the social sciences in general, most work is done in experimental 
economics. Since those experiments tend to contradict basic assumptions 
of neoclassic economics and support sociological reasoning about the im-
portance of social aspects in the exchange relation (Homans, 1961; Blau, 
1968), they have received much attention in sociology (Dieckmann, 2004; 
Fehr and Gintis, 2006; Adloff and Mau, 2006). The most prominent ex-
periment showing the importance of reciprocity is based on the ultimatum 
bargaining game (Güth et al., 1982; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Here a 
proposer and a responder bargain about a certain amount of money, e.g. 
10 Euros. The proposer begins by offering a division of this amount 
between the two and the responder can either accept or reject the offer. If 
it is rejected, neither of the two receives any money, if it is accepted the 
experimenter pays out the money according to the proposer's offer. 
Whereas neoclassical economic theory predicts that the proposer would 
offer only the minimum possible amount, say 1 Euro, to maximize his/her 
utility and the responder would accept this offer for the same reason, the 
results of the ultimatum game differ from this prediction systematically 
(Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). On the one hand the proposer's offers tend 
to be between 40-50% of the amount and therefore much higher than the 
minimum offer as well as close to equity. On the other hand offers below 
30% tend to be rejected by the responder. In this case the responder is 
willing to put up with no money at all instead of accepting an offer far 
from equity. These results can be explained by the fact that the actions 
are not only guided by utility maximization but also by fairness 
considerations and the norm of reciprocity: "Reciprocity means that in 
response to friendly actions, people are frequently much nicer and much 
more cooperative than predicted by the self-interest model; conversely, in 
response to hostile actions they are frequently much more nasty and even 
brutal" (Fehr and Gächter, 2000: 159. 
The ultimatum bargaining game shows, that the valuation of a certain 
amount of money received in a transaction does not only depend on the 
amount itself, but on the way it is received, particularly on whether the 
transaction conforms to the norm of reciprocity. A slight variation of the 
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ultimatum game, where the results of two different versions of the game 
are compared, shows that this involves a certain kind of subjective inter-
pretation of the exchange relationship (Falk, Fischbacher 2006, 2000). In 
both versions the proposer again receives 10 Euros from the experimenter 
and the responder can accept or reject the offer, but now the proposer 
can only chose between two splits. In game (a) the proposer can either 
offer 2 and keep 8 or keep 2 and offer 8 Euros. In game (b) however, the 
proposer can chose between offering 2 and keeping 8 Euros or offering 5 
and keeping 5 Euros. Even though in the case of the 8/2 split the objec-
tive payoff is exactly the same, rejection rates differ between the games 
with higher rejection rates in game (a). “The reason for the different re-
jection pattern is that responders care about why the proposer chose the 
8/2-offer, i.e. they care about the proposer's intentions” (Falk, Fis-
chbacher 2000: 6). In game (b) where a fair split was possible, the re-
sponder tend to infer an unfair intention, whereas in game (a), where no 
fair solution was available, they do not. 
In addition to the influence of violations of the norm of reciprocity on the 
valuation of a certain amount of money, reciprocity considerations can 
also have a negative effect on the valuation of extra payment. Trying to 
ensure extra effort, some employment contracts contain incentives, count-
ing on the assumption that employees will reciprocate. Instead, experi-
ments have shown that such incentive contracts can have unforeseen 
negative effects on effort; they "may 'crowd out' reciprocal effort choices" 
and create "counterproductive effects" (Fehr and Gächter, 2000: 
171/172). Most remarkably, this is the case for incentive contracts con-
taining sanctions for reduced effort but also for contracts that contain a 
bonus for any extra effort made by the employee (Fehr and Gächter, 
2002).  "Explicit incentives may cause a hostile atmosphere of threat and 
distrust, which reduces any reciprocity-based extra effort" (Fehr and 
Gächter, 2000: 170), regardless of whether they are framed as sanctions 
or as bonuses. This "framing effect", as Fehr and Gächter call it, can be 
seen as an expression of the fact that it matters greatly how the wage is 
perceived. 
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2.2 Violations of reciprocity in employment relations 
The experiments reported in the previous section are to a high degree 
guided by the theoretical work of George Akerlof, which in turn is influ-
enced by sociological and social psychological exchange theories e.g. by 
Adams (1963) or Homans (1961). In Akerlof and Yellen (1990) a model is 
proposed to explain behavioral consequences of violations of reciprocity in 
employment relations. According to Akerlof and Yellen the importance of 
the norm of reciprocity for employment relations in contrast to mere utility 
maximization arises from the problem of incomplete employment con-
tracts. This is because employment contracts determine the wage but can 
never cover every detail of the effort expected from the employee and 
even if they could, there would be a problem of incomplete information on 
the part of the firm as to whether an employee fulfils the contract to the 
best of his/her ability or not. The worker’s ability to chose his/her work 
effort within a certain range without having to fear detection by the firm 
opens up the employment relation to fairness or reciprocity considera-
tions. This is reflected in the fair wage-effort hypothesis (Akerlof and 
Yellen, 1990), which states that the relation between a worker’s effort is 
determined by the perceived earnings or wage and the perceived fair 
wage. In the context of exchange in employment relations the fraction this 
relation can be interpreted as the reciprocity between the wage paid by the 
employer (as perceived by the employee) and what is expected by the 
employee as compensation for his/her effort. If the perceived actual wage 
equals the perceived fair wage there is perfect balanced reciprocity, if it is 
lower than the fair wage, there is a perceived violation of reciprocity and 
effort will be lowered to achieve a new balance. Because it is the percep-
tion of ones wage that determines the workers effort, the model therefore 
states objective consequences of more or less subjective evaluations of 
reciprocity in the employment relationship (see also Rousseau 1989).   
However, there are other behavioral consequences of perceived violations 
of the norm of reciprocity besides reducing work effort. As Sheppard et al. 
(1992; see also Liebig, 1997) show, there can be several reactions to 
(perceived) unfair behavior of the firm: loyalty, voice, exit and withdrawal 
behavior. Loyalty behavior means that employees need not react with a 
perceived violation of reciprocity but can rationalize the unfair behavior of 
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the firm, e.g. by adapting their perceptions of what constitutes a wage 
conforming to the norm of reciprocity. Voice behavior means that employ-
ees can react by openly protesting against the perceived violation of recip-
rocity. The reduction of effort can be interpreted as a special form of voice 
behavior if it is done in a deliberately way visible to the employer or their 
representatives in the firm. The option of exit behavior is chosen if em-
ployees react by leaving the job. This is a somewhat strong reaction com-
pared to the reduction of effort predicted in the fair wage-effort hypothe-
sis. But, on the one hand it should be taken into account that unfair 
treatment with regard to the wage not only leads to a loss of income but 
often is interpreted by the employee as a depreciation (Honneth, 2003; 
Kotthoff, 2000) of one’s work for the firm. This makes it plausible that at 
least some proportion of the benefit recipients will react this way. On the 
other hand it is possible that for some employees the reduction of effort is 
not possible and quitting is viewed as the only option. This assumption is 
supported by Fehr and Gintis (2007: 50) who conclude from a public good 
game that "stopping cooperation is the only way to punish other group 
members in the absence of a direct punishment opportunity"ii. Finally, 
withdrawal behavior means that employees lower their commitment to the 
firm. It can take many forms, ranging from a covert reduction of effort to 
absenteeism and even theft or damaging the firm’s property. Except for 
loyalty behavior all the possible reactions to an unfair wage have in com-
mon that they raise the chances for a termination of the employment con-
tract either directly or indirectly. This is most evident in the exit behavior 
which constitutes per definition the end of the employment relation by the 
employee quitting his/her job. But also withdrawal and voice behavior can 
lead to a similar consequence, albeit initiated by the employer. This is be-
cause open as well as covert reduction of effort will influence the firm’s 
decision to keep or dismiss an employee. When reducing effort, employ-
ees are reducing their productivity for the firm compared to the normal 
effort the firm expects, raising the risk of dismissal by the employer. 
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2.3 Hypotheses 
In contrast to regular employment in-work benefits introduce a special 
kind of extra payment, i.e. the subsidy is paid not by the employer but by 
the state. This could be seen by the subsidized employee as a signal that 
the employing firm is not willing to behave according to the norm of recip-
rocity and fair wage payment. Because of the subjectivity involved, this 
can be the case even if the in-work benefit is in fact paid in addition to the 
usual market wage and therefore constitutes an increment of the usual 
wage paid for this kind of job.  
Hypothesis 1: Despite raising the overall income, working in a job subsi-
dized with in-work benefits has a negative effect on the valuation of one's 
wage. 
If this is the case, then we would expect benefit recipients to attach a 
lower value to their income even if, because of the benefit, they earn 
more than they would have in a regular employment. 
If indeed such an effect should be found, this does not automatically imply 
behavioral consequences. As seen before there is a variety of possible re-
actions to perceived unfair behavior by the firm, including adapting one's 
perception (loyalty behavior). However, if there is indeed an adverse ef-
fect of the benefit, this could in turn result in in-work benefits having a 
negative effect on employment stability because benefit recipients behave 
in ways that endanger or actually end the employment relationship. Ag-
gregating behavioral consequences to employment stability, the second 
hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2:  All in all in-work benefits have a negative effect on em-
ployment stability. 
Finally, the third hypothesis concerns the relevance of violations of recip-
rocity for explaining lower employment stability in subsidized jobs: 
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Hypothesis 3: The negative behavioral consequences of in-work benefits 
on employment stability can be explained by their negative effect on the 
valuation of one's wage. 
This means that in-work benefits are not successful in permanent labor 
market integration despite raising the overall income, because they also 
lead to negative side effects that undo any positive effects.  
 
3 Data and estimation method 
To test these hypotheses laboratory or field experiments could be con-
ducted, randomizing subjects into a treatment group receiving an in-work 
benefit and a control group in regular employment. Aside from the huge 
logistic efforts this would take, it is not clear whether in this case a ran-
domization is technically possible or ethically justifiable. A different option 
is to use observational data, that is data collected from actual recipients 
and non-recipients of in-work benefits, and eliminate all systematic differ-
ences between them. The following subsections describe such a data 
source and introduce propensity score matching as a method to approxi-
mate a randomized experiment in situations with non-random selection 
into treatment and control status. 
 
3.1 Data 
Data for the kind of analysis needed here are hard to find. The testing of 
the above hypotheses requires not only objective data on the employment 
situation (e.g. wage, industry sector) but also information about the sub-
jective judgments of employees concerning their wage. On the one hand 
existing surveys often contain such information. However, these surveys 
typically do not contain information about such special labor market pro-
grams as in-work benefits and if they do, the number of cases is very low. 
On the other hand administrative data used for the evaluation of labor 
market programs is available for every single participant but the range of 
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variables is limited to information needed by employment agencies, which 
excludes "soft" information (for administrative data see Hakim, 1983; for 
a comparison of survey and administrative data see Hartmann and Krug, 
2007). However, for the evaluation of the in-work benefit "Mainzer Mod-
ell", that was finished 2005 (Kaltenborn et al., 2005), a survey was con-
ducted, including benefit recipients as well as a comparison group of non-
recipients. Even though the survey was originally not intended for this 
purpose, it contains sufficient information to be used to test the hypothe-
ses formulated above. 
In 2000 the "Mainzer Modell" (Gerster and Deubel, 2001; Kaltenborn et 
al., 2005; Schneider, 2002) was started as a pilot project in certain areas 
of Rhineland-Palatinate and Brandenburg to evaluate the use of in-work 
benefits in Germany. Not long after, in May 2002 it was extended to all 
areas in Germany. Eligibility was means tested and mainly based on the 
applicant starting a new employment with wages above 320 Euro, 
whereby overall household income (including income from this job) had to 
be below certain thresholds. The benefit was implemented as a subsidy to 
social security contributions; for persons with children the subsidy was 
supplemented with higher child benefits. Consequently, subsidized em-
ployees receiving the same gross wage as regularly employed persons 
have higher net wages.  
In 2003 the "Mainzer Modell" was discontinued and replaced by so called 
“Mini and Midi Jobs” (Rudolph, 2003; Caliendo and Wrolich, 2006) but 
benefits already granted were paid until 2006. The data used here is a 
representative survey conducted in 5 waves by TNS Infratest Sozialfor-
schung (Hartmann, 2004) and financed by the (then) German Federal 
Ministry of Economics and Labor.  
Interviews were conducted (stratified by region and time of starting em-
ployment) with benefit recipients and non-recipients who started work be-
tween January 2001 and August 2002 (pilot project phase) and between 
September 2002 and March 2003 (nationwide implementation). 3,080 in-
terviews were carried out with benefit recipients and 1,443 with non-
recipients as a control group, the latter being a random sample of all low 
skilled and/or long-term unemployed persons starting a new employment. 
Since the comparison group was restricted to those low skilled and/or un-
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employed, this leaves 1,176 recipients who also meet this criterion. After 
eliminating non-recipients who - contrary to initial information from proc-
ess data - were actually not employed at all and after elimination of single 
parentsiii, the analysis was left with 1,199 cases, 564 benefit recipients 
and 635 control individuals. 
Survey questions ranged from objective data on socio-demographic char-
acteristics, employment history, household context, individual and house-
hold income to subjective information on attitudes towards different as-
pects of life and employment as well as satisfaction with different aspects 
of the job. The Question "How satisfied have you been with your earn-
ings?" (“Wie zufrieden waren sie mit dem Verdienst?”)  is used to capture 
on the valuation of one's wage. Answers were measured on a four point 
scale of "very satisfied, satisfied, not satisfied, not at all satisfied". For the 
matching analysis the variable was dichotomized with "very satisfied" and 
" satisfied" indicating satisfaction with one’s wage. To analyze the behav-
ioral consequences of perceived violations of reciprocity the duration of 
the (non-)subsidized job and employment status at the time of the inter-
view was used. 
 
3.2 The matching estimator for causal effects  
For the following analysis let iwb  be a dummy treatment indicator for a 
job being subsidized with an in-work benefit or not and let s  be a binary 
outcome variable indicating whether the employee in this job is satisfied 
with his/her wage or not. Following Rubin's Causal Model (RCM, see 
Rubin, 1974; Holland, 1986; Rubin, 2005; Gangl and DiPrete, 2004; 
Winship and Morgan, 1999; Sobel, 1995) two potential versions of the 
outcome variable have to be distinguished, depending on whether the job 
is subsidized or not: 
    ⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
=
==
1,
0,
1
0
iwbfs
iwbifs
s    
Within this framework one important causal effect is the average causal 
effect of treatment on the treated δ : 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 28/2007   
 
 
 
18
)1|()1|( 01 =−== iwbsEiwbsEδ   
This causal effect compares what is the outcome of working in a subsi-
dized job for those who received the subsidy with the outcome the same 
persons would have experienced if they had not worked in a subsidized 
job. In this sense δ  is a counterfactual causal effect. Because the 
outcome variable is binary, the causal effect can be interpreted as the 
difference in the probability of being satisfied with one's wage induced by 
in-work benefits. 
Since, however, one person cannot be employed both in a subsidized job 
and an unsubsidized job at the same time, the counterfactual expectation 
)1|( 0 =iwbsE  is impossible to estimate from the data. The problem can be 
solved if a vector x  can be identified that contains all the variables that 
simultaneously influence whether a person receives an in-work benefit and 
his/her wage satisfaction. This can be achieved best, if x  covers as much 
of the process by which individuals select themselves or are assigned to a 
job subsidized with an in-work benefit (the assignment mechanism, see 
Rubin 1991). If this is successfully done, conditional mean independence 
between treatment status iwb  and outcome variable s is achieved:  
)|(),0|(),1|( 000 xxx sEiwbsEiwbsE ====   
It follows that the counterfactual expectation can be replaced by a factual 
expectation of the wage satisfaction given regular employment (Holland 
1986): 
     ( )),0|(),1|( 01 xxx =−== iwbsEiwbsEEδ   
It is necessary to point out that when relevant aspects of the assignment 
process could not be included in the vector of covariates x , selection bias 
is still present and can distort the actual causal effectiv. 
A nonparametric estimator for the causal effect under conditional mean 
independence is the matching estimator (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, 
1985; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Heckman et al., 1998; Morgan and 
Harding, 2006). It estimates δ  by matching benefit recipients to regularly 
employed persons with an identical vector of covariates x  to create two 
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subsamples that differ only in receiving or not receiving the in-work bene-
fit. Since with many covariates exact matches are hard to find, 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propose to match on the propensity score 
which is a scalar. This score is defined as the probability of receiving an 
in-work benefit conditional on the covariates: )()1|( xx PiwbP == . This leads 
to the following equivalent representation of the causal effect δ : 
   ( )))(,0|())(,1|( 01)( xxx PiwbsEPiwbsEEP =−==δ  . 
The corresponding matching estimator for the causal effect δ is given by  
∑ ∑∑
∈ ∈∈
−=
1 01
))(,(1)(1ˆ 0
1
1
1 Ii Ij
j
Ii
i sjiwn
s
n
δ , 
with 1I  and 0I  denoting benefit recipients and regularly employed control 
persons, respectively. 1n  is the number of individuals of the recipient 
group and ),( jiw  is the weight given to observation j  when matched to 
observation i . Depending on the choice of ),( jiw , different versions of the 
matching estimators can be constructed. For example, in single-nearest 
neighbor matching (SNNM) without replacement, observation j  is chosen 
as a match to observation i , when it is closest to i  in terms of the absolute 
distance of their propensity scores |)()(| ji PP xx − . 
To avoid matches where )( jP x  even though being the nearest neighbor to 
)( iP x  is very far from it, a maximum level of acceptable distances (caliper) 
has to be set. SNNM then weighs the outcome of the observation j  whose 
propensity score is closest to observation i 's propensity score with 
1),( =jiw  and all other control observations with 0),( =jiw  and computes 
the causal effectv. Since usually the exact probabilities of receiving a 
treatment are unknown, they are estimated by a logistic regression. Even 
though similarity of matches is only based on the probability of receiving a 
benefit, propensity score matching leads to a balancing of all covariates 
(and therefore elimination of all compositional effects) between the recipi-
ents and the control group.  
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4 Empirical analysis 
4.1 Assignment mechanism 
Central to the application of Rubins`s Causal Model is the fulfillment of the 
conditional independence condition. Within the framework of the RCM the 
researcher need not know the determinants of the outcome variable, but 
only the determinants of the probability of receiving an in-work benefit. In 
the case of the outcome variable “wage satisfaction”, this seems to be a 
mayor advantage compared to regression analysis, since it can be as-
sumed that there are many difficult to observe influences on such subjec-
tive evaluations. Still, reaching conditional independence presupposes 
comprehensive knowledge about the implementation of the concrete in-
work benefit under analysis, which in part is derived from explorative 
analysis of the "Mainzer Modell’s" implementation conducted by the  Insti-
tut für Arbeit und Technik (IAT) (Kalina et al., 2004: 29ff, see also Cords, 
2003) and in part from our own considerations.  
Whether a job is subsidized with an in-work benefit or not depends on the 
interaction of three different aspects of the assignment mechanism: Self-
selection of the job seeker (1), assignment by the employment agency’s 
case manager (2) and selection by an employing firm (3). These aspects 
are addressed sequentially in this subsectionvi.  
(1) Self-selection: 
Self-selection means that even if eligible only certain people chose to ap-
ply for an in-work benefit, while others do not. The probability of a job be-
ing subsidized with an in-work benefit therefore certainly depends on 
whether the individual knows about this kind of subsidy at all. Information 
material about the MZM was mainly written in German and often informa-
tion about the availability of in-work benefits was given by providers of 
further training. Therefore migrants might have a lower probability and 
persons having taken further training a higher probability of self-selecting 
into receiving benefits. Quite generally the chances to receive an in-work 
benefit will depend on whether the job was found via the unemployment 
agency or another way, such as friends or the unemployed’s own efforts. 
Furthermore an individual's decision to take up a job subsidized with a fi-
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nancial benefit will be guided by whether he expects to profit more from 
the subsidized job than from regular employment. This might be the case 
for the long-term unemployed and for those with disadvantages in the la-
bor market (persons with low human capital, the older unemployed, 
women, etc.). In addition, the amount of the benefit varies, depending on 
whether there is a partner with an income of his/her own and the number 
of children in the household. This too can influence the decision to apply 
for an in-work benefit. 
(2) Assignment by the case manager: 
When deciding to offer an in-work benefit to an unemployed job seeker, 
case managers are confronted with two restrictions. Firstly, there are offi-
cial rules of eligibility, which in the "Mainzer Modell" were mainly based on 
household income. Since there was no right to be granted an in-work 
benefit and since the unemployed as well as the employment officers con-
sidered the determination of eligibility very difficult, this does not mean 
that being subsidized is completely determined by the household income 
(in this case the matching approach would not be suitable). Low incomes 
only heighten the probability of being subsidized. Furthermore, it is well 
known that the German segregation of unemployment insurance on the 
one and welfare benefits on the other hand lead the employment agencies 
to focus on integrating (costly) recipients of unemployment insurance 
benefits (Gerster and Deubel, 2001). Therefore there might be selectivity 
of assignment depending on this, too. With the calculation of eligibility 
having been very complex and time consuming, this could have led to the 
case manager having less time to focus on the match between the appli-
cant's qualification and the firm’s requirements. In addition, rules of eligi-
bility tended to favor the subsidizing of part-time jobs, since eligibility was 
based on monthly and not hourly wages. 
Secondly and of considerable importance, since the claiming of in-work 
benefits turned out to be lower than expected, case managers needed to 
take an active part in motivating the unemployed to take up subsidized 
jobs. Basically there are two possibilities. Case managers can focus on of-
fering the in-work benefit to those they see as especially needy and who 
would have low chances of finding a regular job (negative selection). Or 
they can focus on those persons with a high probability of staying in the 
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job, so that the benefit is "well spent" (positive selection). In any case 
variables should be controlled for that are correlated with labor market 
success, e.g. regional labor market conditions, prior history of participa-
tion in active labor market programs, search effort during unemployment, 
work experience, prior history of unemployment and on who’s initiative 
the last job was terminated. 
 (3) Selection by the employing firm: 
Contrary to initial expectations firms showed very little interest in offering 
new jobs to benefit recipients. The selection of employing firms is, there-
fore, of rather marginal importance. Firms who later employed subsidized 
persons usually did not even know that their employee was receiving an 
in-work benefit (Gewiese, 2004: 275f; Cords, 2003: 114). However, it can 
be hypothesized that firms offering jobs eligible for financial subsidies 
might be situated in different business sectors than those offering regular 
jobs.  
Table 1: The model for computing the propensity scores 
 
Logistic Regression of working 
in a job subsidized with an in-
work benefit 
 
  
Model 1: full 
model before 
matching 
Model 2: reduced 
model before 
matching 
Model 3: reduced 
model after 
matching 
 Odds 
Ratio 
p 
Odds 
Ratio 
p Odds 
Ratio 
p 
Household constellation (R: 
single, no children) 
      
 Partner unemployed, no chil-
dren 
2.615 0.00 2.418 0.00 0.611 0.20 
 Partner employed, no chil-
dren 
1.107 0.76 1.196 0.56 0.704 0.40 
 Partner unemployed, with 
children 
6.716 0.00 5.843 0.00 0.726 0.35 
 Partner employed, with chil-
dren 
2.340 0.00 2.047 0.01 0.457 0.06 
Working hours 0.954 0.00 0.958 0.00 0.999 0.90 
Match person-job (R: no 
qualifications necessary) 
      
Good match 1.095 0.70     
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Average or bad match 1.185 0.61     
How did employee find the 
job?  (R: employment agency) 
      
Friends 0.884 0.63 0.853 0.51 0.688 0.24 
Own effort 1.033 0.90 1.052 0.83 0.591 0.10 
Other 0.601 0.05 0.612 0.05 0.954 0.89 
Job training before 2.943 0.03 2.765 0.04 1.197 0.78 
Unemployment compensation 
before employment (R: un-
employment insurance)  
      
Unemployment benefit 2.694 0.00 2.673 0.00 0.802 0.46 
No compensation 0.861 0.57 0.803 0.38 1.094 0.79 
Social benefits 2.885 0.00 2.870 0.00 0.777 0.53 
Formal Qualification (R: none)       
Skilled worker/technical train-
ing (Facharbeiter/lehre) 
0.940 0.79     
Vocational training/master 
craftsman/technician 
(Berufs)fachsch./meister. 
techniker)  
1.106 0.74     
University, university of ap-
plied sciences 
(Fach)hochschule) 
0.890 0.78     
Other 0.563 0.25     
Nationality (German) 0.688 0.19     
Sex (female) 0.893 0.60     
Age 0.997 0.85     
Temporary employment con-
tract 
2.485 0.00 2.546 0.00 1.050 0.83 
Industry sector (dummy vari-
ables) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Job important (yes) 1.022 0.91     
Family  important (yes) 0.841 0.43     
Leisure time  important (yes) 1.197 0.39     
Income important (yes) 1.048 0.81 1.073 0.68 1.165 0.52 
Work important (yes) 1.015 0.94     
Search effort (number of dif-
ferent search strategies used) 
1.194 0.00 1.169 0.00 0.997 0.97 
Ever turned down employ-
ment offer because wage was 
too low? 
1.526 0.16 1.682 0.07 1.035 0.93 
Is job interim employment? 1.123 0.51     
Job experience (years) 1.017 0.28     
Duration of unemployment in       
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career (< 6 month) 
6 - 12  month 0.418 0.02 0.420 0.01 1.529 0.37 
12 - 24 month 1.123 0.71 1.172 0.61 1.619 0.26 
> 24 month 1.006 0.98 1.070 0.81 1.388 0.39 
Subsidized employment im-
mediately before this one 
1.349 0.37     
Different kind of ALMP imme-
diately before employment 
1.085 0.83     
Who ended last employment? 
(R: other) 
      
Employee 1.562 0.19 1.608 0.15 0.991 0.98 
Employer 1.585 0.03 1.735 0.01 0.873 0.60 
Labor market situation 
(dummy variables) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Income from secondary em-
ployment (yes) 
0.442 0.07 0.478 0.09 1.308 0.65 
Household income 0.999 0.00 0.999 0.00 1.000 0.20 
Gross wages per hour (R: up 
to 4.60 Euro) 
      
4.61 to  6.90 Euros 0.952 0.87 1.072 0.81 0.761 0.45 
6.91 to 9.20 Euros 0.687 0.24 0.773 0.40 0.970 0.94 
9.21 Euros or more 0.594 0.14 0.694 0.28 0.865 0.74 
No  (plausible) answer 0.658 0.19 0.740 0.32 0.794 0.56 
cases (benefit recipients) 974 (500) 983 (503) 372 (186) 
Pseudo R2 0.337 0.328 0.026 
Log likelihood -447.400 -457.874 -251.119 
ch2 454.757 446.440 13.46 
LR-Test (prob>chi2) 0.000 0.000 1.000 
aic 1,008.800 995.749 582.238 
bic 1,287.040 1,191.373 738.993 
 
Finally, in addition to these three kinds of selection variables from the 
theoretical perspective it seems important to control for aspects that 
might influence wage satisfaction, such as the attitude toward different 
areas of life (e.g. work, income), whether the individual rejected a job of-
fer because of low wages and whether there is an income from a second 
job as well as gross hourly wages. The “Mainzer Modell” was implemented 
as a reduction of social security contribution and - potentially - higher 
child allowances. So for every two persons with the same gross wage and 
the same value of other covariates, net wages of recipients are higher 
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than those of non-recipients by the amount of the benefit. In the propen-
sity-score-matched sample per definition this does not need to hold for 
the matched individuals, but it holds for the mean of gross and net wages 
in both groups.  
Table 1 shows the logistic regression of receiving benefits on the variables 
identified in this subsectionvii.  The variables with coefficients that are not 
significant can be eliminated from the computations of the propensity 
score. On the one hand they do not lead to a significantly different com-
position of recipients and non-recipients but on the other hand they lead 
problems of the precision of the estimator (Imbens 2004: 23).  For the 
following analysis the insignificant variables were eliminatedviii except for 
some that from this paper's theoretical perspective seemed too relevant to 
be excluded (e.g. importance of income, turned down low wage job). As 
can be seen from the values of Akiake’s information criterion (aic) and the 
Bayesian information criterion (bic) the reduction of variables involves 
only a small loss of information. 
 
4.2 Testing the hypotheses 
Applying the matching approach to the problem at hand, firstly the influ-
ence of in-work benefits on wage satisfaction is considered (hypothesis 1). 
From Table 2 we can see that before matching there is a difference of 23 
percentage points in wage satisfaction between subsidized employees and 
regularly employed persons. This difference includes the compositional 
differences of both groups. When matching is performed to eliminate 
these differences, matches within the range of the caliper (0.005 percent-
age points) were found for 186 benefit recipients. This leaves the analysis 
with fewer cases but ensures that only those members of the two groups 
that are very similar to each other are used for comparison. As can be 
seen in Table 1, after the matching of recipients and nonrecipients, the 
likelihood-ratio-test shows that the hypothesis “all coefficients are zero” 
can not be rejected, suggesting that balance of all covariates has been 
achievedix.  
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Comparing means of the outcome variable in the treatment group (Table 
2) it can be seen that there was a negative selection. That is, persons with 
individual and job characteristics that lead them to be dissatisfied with 
their wage end up receiving in-work benefits more frequently. But even 
after the elimination of compositional differences, subsidized jobs lead to a 
statistically significant (t-value of 2.82) decrease of 14 percentage points 
in the percentage of mean wage satisfaction. Accordingly, the first result 
of this analysis is that the hypothesis stating that in-work benefits nega-
tively affect the valuation of one’s wage despite raising overall incomes is 
supported by the data.  
Table 2: The causal effect of in-work benefits on wage satisfaction   
 Wage satisfaction: yes 
 
Subsidized em-
ployment 
Regular em-
ployment 
(Causal) 
effect 
t-value 
Before matching 0.36 0.59 -0.23 7.38 
After matching 0.41 0.55 -0.14 2.82 
SNNM without replacement, caliper = 0.005 
 
Since this result could be explained not only by the signal effect of the in-
work benefit, but also by less attractive working conditions, we compared 
the judgment of subsidized and regular employees on their satisfaction 
with the kind of job. After the matching there is no significant difference in 
job satisfaction between subsidized and regular employees (Table 3).   
Table 3: The causal effect of in-work benefits on satisfaction with 
the job 
 Job satisfaction: yes 
 
Subsidized em-
ployment 
Regular em-
ployment 
(Causal) 
effect 
t-value 
Before matching 0.773 0.821 -0.05 -1.85 
After matching 0.770 0.818 -0.05 -1.15 
SNNM without replacement, caliper = 0.005 
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To test the second hypothesis, the effect of extra payments in the form of 
an in-work benefit on employment stability, the method of regression ad-
justed matching is applied (Rubin, 1973). This means that a regression is 
performed on the sample of matched pairs of recipients and non-
recipients. With the employment duration as the outcome of interest, a 
Cox-Regression is chosen; the results are displayed in Table 4, model 1. 
Contrary to what was expected, the effect of receiving an in-work benefit 
on the propensity to stay employed is not significant and only slightly 
negative, raising the risk of a job termination only by 1.5%. Therefore hy-
pothesis 2 must be rejected. However, there is also no positive effect of 
the extra income on employment stability of benefit recipients as expected 
from a utility maximizing perspective. This could mean that the in-work 
benefits do lead to a perceived violation of reciprocity resulting in lower 
probabilities of being satisfied with the wage (as reflected in hypothesis 1 
and supported by the data), but this effect is not strong enough to lead to 
negative effects on employment stability. It only suppresses the positive 
effects of the additional income on the propensity to stay employed, lead-
ing to spurious independence of in-work benefits and employment stability 
in model 1. Therefore hypothesis 3 is slightly revised: 
Hypothesis 3 (revised): The nonexistent behavioral consequences of in-
work benefits on employment stability can be explained by their negative 
effect on the valuation of one’s wage. 
This revised hypothesis 3 can be tested by looking at the net effect of the 
benefit. It is important to note that the effect displayed in Table 4 (full 
sample) is the overall effect of the benefit on employment stability and 
therefore includes the direct as well as the indirect effect (i.e. the effect 
via wage satisfaction) of benefit recipience. To adjust the net effect for the 
indirect effect the latter has to be held constant. This can be achieved 
similar to the classical three-variables analysis (Lazarsfeld, 1955; Nowak, 
1960), even though Rubins Causal Model suggests that this strategy is not 
always as straightforward as one might expect since it suggests adjusting 
for a covariate already influenced by the causal variable (Rosenbaum 
1984a). If, however, the conditional independence holds for the variables 
iwb  and s as well as iwb  and es  (the latter denoting employment stability), 
this problem can be ignored and the analysis can be done by stratifying 
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the matching analysis based on the binary indicator for wage satisfaction. 
By doing this, the effect of in-work benefits on the valuation of wage is 
eliminated leaving only the net effect(s) of the benefit on employment 
stability (Table 4, Samples 1 and 2).  
Table 4: The overall and net causal effect of in-work benefits on 
employment stability: Cox-Regressions on the matched samples 
 
Cox-Regressions full sample 
Sample 1: 
satisfied 
Sample 0: 
not satisfied 
 
Hazard 
Ratio p 
Hazard 
Ratio p 
Hazard 
Ratio p 
In-work benefit 1.015 0.94 0.702 0.29 0.929 0.82 
Household constellation (R: single. no 
children) 
  
  
  
Partner unemployed (no children) 0.684 0.27 0.919 0.89 0.932 0.91 
Partner employed (no children) 0.775 0.50 0.890 0.86 1.549 0.52 
Partner unemployed (with children) 0.769 0.35 1.902 0.25 0.701 0.50 
Partner employed (with children) 0.804 0.52 1.151 0.82 1.284 0.68 
Working hours 1.014 0.08 1.003 0.84 1.051 0.00 
How did employee find the job?  (R: 
employment agency) 
  
  
  
Friends 0.669 0.17 0.533 0.20 1.041 0.93 
Own effort 1.035 0.90 1.191 0.71 1.538 0.34 
Other 0.749 0.30 0.723 0.52 0.577 0.35 
Job training before 0.375 0.34 0.775 0.83   
Unemployment compensation before 
employment  
(R: unemployment insurance)  
  
  
  
Unemployment benefit 0.947 0.83 0.544 0.21 0.949 0.90 
No compensation 0.980 0.94 0.588 0.36 1.101 0.83 
Social benefits 1.137 0.68 2.048 0.24 0.863 0.77 
Temporary employment contract 1.317 0.17 1.481 0.28 0.733 0.38 
Industry sector (dummy variables) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Income important (yes) 1.090 0.67 1.460 0.30 0.716 0.33 
Search effort (number of different 
search strategies used) 
1.022 0.71 
1.018 0.86 
0.940 0.54 
Ever turned down employment offer 
because wage was too low? 
0.645 0.24 
0.771 0.63 
0.520 0.35 
Duration of unemployment in career 
(< 6 months) 
  
  
  
6 - 12  months 1.252 0.61 4.631 0.07 1.384 0.63 
12 - 24 months 1.484 0.29 4.348 0.05 2.046 0.21 
> 24 months 1.766 0.08 4.341 0.04 1.663 0.33 
Who ended last employment? (R: 
other) 
  
  
  
Employee 1.141 0.74 2.369 0.18 1.052 0.95 
Employer 1.084 0.72 1.558 0.24 0.658 0.28 
Type of labor market situation (dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes 
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variables) 
Income from secondary employment 
(yes) 
2.499 0.02 0.877 0.86 6.332 0.02 
Household income 1.000 0.59 0.999 0.04 0.999 0.10 
Gross wages per hour (R: up to 4.60 
Euro) 
  
  
  
4.61 to  6.90 Euro 0.742 0.30 0.284 0.02 1.071 0.89 
6.91 to 9.20 Euro 0.563 0.11 0.583 0.37 0.930 0.91 
9.21 Euro or higher 0.847 0.66 0.296 0.10 3.840 0.04 
No  (plausible) answer 0.966 0.92 0.352 0.09 1.323 0.64 
cases 363 171 177 
Log likelihood -633.360 -226.928 -251.711 
Note: The missing coefficient of the variable „Job training before” reflects the fact that 
very few of the matched pairs in model 3 received a job training before accepting the 
(subsidized) job. These cases had to be eliminated to estimate the Cox-Regression. This 
was done too with one “Types of labor market situation” dummy in model 2 and with 
one “Industry sector” dummy in model 2 and 3 respectively. 
 
In accordance with the revised hypothesis 3 stratifying on the intervening 
wage satisfaction indeed leads to a positive effect of in-work benefits on 
employment stability (i.e. a lower hazard rate) both in the sample of satis-
fied as well as dissatisfied employees, but none of the effects is 
significant. Whether this is due to the low number of cases (171 and 177 
respectively) cannot be said.  
All in all the data gives some support to the explanation of the - 
counterintuitive - zero-effect of the extra income from in-work benefits on 
employment stability by their negative effect on satisfaction with the wage 
received. However, it is an equally valid interpretation of the data that the 
measured negative causal effect of subsidized wages on the valuation of 
this wage does not lead to the behavioral consequences on the stability of 
social relations proposed sociological theory (e.g. Sahlins, 1965; Blau 
1968; Bode and Brose 1999: 181). 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper we analyzed why the extra income in a subsidized employ-
ment does not lead to higher employment stability, even though, by leav-
ing the subsidized job employees lose more income than the regularly 
employed. The reason proposed is that even though raising the income, 
in-work benefits are interpreted as a signal that the wage paid by the em-
ploying firm does not conform to the norm of reciprocity. This hypothesis 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 28/2007   
 
 
 
30
was tested on the basis of survey data and the method of propensity score 
matching. Whereas the hypothesis of lower valuation of the wage due to 
working in a subsidized job was confirmed, the question whether this ex-
plains the low success of in-work benefits in reintegrating unemployed 
into employment remained unresolved.  
Before proceeding with the conclusions it is necessary to address some 
limitations on the generalization of these results. The first aspect to be 
considered is generalization to all recipients of in-work benefits. The re-
sults reported in this paper are based on a survey of people with low skills 
and/or the long-term unemployed, whereby single parents have been ex-
cluded. This means that the effect of in-work benefits on those who nei-
ther have low skills nor are the long-term unemployed could differ from 
the one presented here, even if it seems likely that skilled employees 
working in low wage jobs subsidized by the state will also perceive a viola-
tion of reciprocity, maybe even more so. As far as single parents are con-
cerned, this group might or might not be as susceptible to perceived viola-
tions of reciprocity. Which is the case cannot be answered with the avail-
able data. The second aspect concerns the generalization to other kinds of 
in-work benefits. Even though the analysis leads to the conclusion that in-
work benefits raise the probability of perceiving a violation of reciprocity 
for employees, this does not necessarily mean that other forms of imple-
menting such benefits, e.g. with permanent instead of temporary payment 
of benefits, will lead to the same negative side effects. Also additional 
wage subsidies to the employer might produce a second, positive effect by 
reducing labor costs for the firms, thereby balancing reductions of effort 
by the employee. 
As to the broader implications of the results presented here, even though 
the evidence is not unambiguous, for implementing labor market pro-
grams concerned with integrating the unemployed into permanent em-
ployment, it seems sensible to take into account that employment rela-
tions have not only a financial, but also a social side to them. By focusing 
on a financial supplementation, in-work benefits are aimed at avoiding 
permanent welfare dependence without forcing the unemployed to take up 
extremely low wage jobs. But at the same time they tend to disregard the 
social elements of employment relations, in this case the norm of reciproc-
IABDiscussionPaper No. 28/2007   
 
 
 
31
ity on the one hand and on the other the fact that people are not always 
rational in the sense that their actions are guided by "objective" facts that 
are shared by policy makers, employers and employees alike. This obser-
vation very much conforms to Bourdon’s analysis that rational behavior 
need not be based on objective facts alone. It can also be motivated by 
things the actors consider to be true, but that are actually wrong or seen 
differently by different persons, and can still be rational (Boudon 1996, 
1998). Contrary to this, many labor market programs are based on the 
rationality assumption of neoclassical economics (called "strong rationality 
assumptions" by Goldthorpe, 2000). Whether this has or has not conse-
quences on effectiveness is a question that unfortunately could not be re-
solved here. However, it might be interesting for further research to ana-
lyze whether at least part of the missing success of other active labor 
market policies, that has been noted repeatedly (e.g. Eichhorst and 
Zimmermann, 2007; Wunsch and Lechner, 2007), can be attributed to the 
divergence between underlying behavioral assumptions and a more di-
verse social reality.  
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Endnotes 
                                                
i The pilot-projects all paid the in-work benefit for a limited time, ranging 
from 10 months in the "Hamburger Modell" to 36 month in the "Mainzer 
Modell". 
ii In this experiment free riders could not be punished during the first 10 
rounds of the game, which led to high refusals to cooperate. After intro-
ducing the opportunity to punish, however, social cooperation was high. 
iii The reason being, on the one hand, that in the "Mainzer Model" single 
parents could get an in-work benefit even if they did not work in the low 
wage sector (e.g. by reducing working hours). Because of this they might 
differ substantially in regard to the evaluation of the fairness of subsidized 
wages. On the other hand the control group did not contain sufficient 
numbers of single parents, so it was neither possible to perform a sepa-
rate matching analysis of this subgroup alone nor to achieve balance in a 
propensity score matching with single parents included in the sample. 
iv Extensive tests have been performed to make sure that no relevant 
variable is missing, including using different outcome variables as pro-
posed in Rosenbaum, 1984b  and  applying methods that do not rely on 
the full observation of the selection variables, e.g. a bivariate Heckman 
selection model (Angrist, 1991). The results are not presented here but 
are available from the author on request. They always indicate that no 
relevant variables are missing. Of course this only supports the conditional 
independence assumption but does not prove it, since it is in principle not 
verifiable.  
v When more than one control observation is used, as with multiple-
nearest neighbor matching (MNNM), the counterfactual is constructed as a 
weighted mean of the matched controls. 
vi This implies a different perspective from the one taken in most evalua-
tions of active labor market policies. Here we see the (non) subsidized 
employment, the interaction between employer and employee, as the unit 
of analysis, whereas the usual approach to ALMP evaluations is dominated 
by the focus on the individual unemployed deciding for or against taking 
up employment. 
vii The survey has no information on firm size, so it cannot be included in 
the logistic regression. Since this can pose a problem for the conditional 
independence assumption, the influence of firm size on receiving the in-
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work benefit "Mainzer Modell" was tested with register data. The influence 
was found to be very small and statistically not significant. 
viii For this a likelihood ratio test was performed. Extensive sensitivity 
analysis has shown that including all variables does not lead to substan-
tially different results in the causal effect. 
ix More extensive balancing tests, including bivariate t-tests and standard-
ized bias computations, are available from the author upon request.  
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